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The Objects of Poliq : Continentalism, Hemispherism, Globalism 
In  the bitter struggle between expansionists and anti-imperialists 
in America following the Spanish-American War, the expansionists 
often insisted that they were only continuing the tradition of expan- 
sionism that had characterized American foreign policy ever since 
the foundation of the Union. The anti-imperialists indignantly 
rejected this line of argument. In their view there lay an impassable 
gulf between traditional expansionism and the new imperialism. 
The earlier form of expansion had involved only the North Ameri- 
can continent and only contiguous territory, completely or partially 
uninhabited, intended for cultivation and settlement by Americans, 
to be incorporated into the Union states, each on equal terms with 
the others. This kind of expansionism was usually called conti- 
nentalism. I t  was also what was meant by the celebrated term 
Manifest Destiny. The manifest destiny doctrine had gained many 
adherents during the 1830's and 1840's. Its message was that it was 
the clear and inevitable lot of the United States to absorb all of 
North America. Manifest destiny also came to refer not least to the 
annexation of land suitable for a system of slavery. This expansion- 
ism, largely championed by adherents of the Democratic Party, 
was regarded with distrust in the northeastern states, as a threat to 
the balance of power in the Union. By following the doctrine of 
continental manifest destiny the United States acquired Texas, 
Oregon, and the southwestern regions including California. 
Years ago Charles A. Beard stressed that American expansionism 
during the nineteenth century comprised too quite different types of 
land acquisition, represented by two wholly separate groups and 
based on different conceptions of national interest. One was conti- 
nentalism, striving for annexation of neighboring territories which 
could be settled and cultivated. This was an agrarian expansion, 
inaugurated under Jefferson, pursued by the Democrats during the 
whole of the nineteenth century. The other form of expansionism 
was overseas annexation. I t  developed as a parallel movement to 
the industrialization of America, aiming not at acquisition of land 
for cultivation, but at  acquisition of naval bases and coaling stations, 
island trade centers and spheres of control. The goal was new 
markets for trade and investment. 
This dualistic view of American expansion is clearly oversimpli- 
fied. The agrarian expansionism at the end of the nineteenth 
century also had commercial aims. But it is quite clear that mani- 
fest destiny expansionism or continentalism was basically of an 
agrarian nature. When, after 1898 and above all in the presidential 
election campaign of 1900, the political parties disagreed on foreign 
policy, the Democrats mainly adopted the well-tried continentalist 
point of view. They declared in favor of this type of expansion, but 
rejected the new type that the McKinley administration had 
introduced and which they described as imperialism. The Demo- 
cratic presidential candidate, William Jennings Bryan, summed up 
their attitude quite clearly in his letter of acceptance: "The Demo- 
cratic Party does not oppose expansion when expansion enlarges the 
area of the republic and incorporates land which can be settled by 
American citizens, or adds to our population people who are willing 
to become citizens and are capable of discharging their duties as 
such." 
However, neither Bryan nor the rest of the Democrats, nor most 
of the other anti-imperialists, opposed acquisition of naval bases and 
coaling stations for the benefit of American foreign trade. They all 
agreed that the United States ought to obtain these facilities in the 
Philippines. But they strongly objected to annexation of the entire 
group of islands. For Bryan and many of those who shared his views, 
this was a question of ideology, and they denied that the Constitu- 
tion permitted American rule over any people "without the consent 
of the governed." The New York World put the situation more 
bluntly: "The flag raised by Rear-Admiral Dewey in Manila is 
there to stay. There is no occasion for hysterics to assure this fact. 
. . . But Manila is not the Philippines. Its possession and retention 
fortunately do not impose upon us the government and care of 
1,400 islands, with their seven millions of barbarians. We have the 
juice of the orange without the rind and pulp." The same tone was 
heard in many quarters, as in The American Grocer: "It is not neces- 
sary in order to secure commerce to own territory, for nations buy, 
as do individuals, in the cheapest market; but it is necessary to have 
coaling and naval stations the world over." 
The truth is that the division of opinion among Americans at  the 
turn of the century was not quite as Beard saw it. Indeed the situa- 
tion was complex. Neither the World nor the Grocer nor Bryan saw 
the problem of expansion from the point of view of the Constitution, 
or ideology. They represented what can be called informalism, 
since their goal was sometimes designated "the informal empire." 
The consistent informalists often joined the genuine anti-imperialists 
in criticizing the new expansionism. They protested on practical and 
rational, not ideological grounds. Informalists often advocated a 
dynamic commercial-economic expansionism, but their analysis of 
the problem led them to the conclusion that the usual imperialistic 
type of territorial expansion was obsolete and produced more 
disadvantages than advantages. Their idea was that more efficient 
results could be achieved by economic control of an informal 
empire than by old-fashioned empire-building or indeed any form 
of expensive and politically troublesome territiorial annexation. 
History proved them right and the rapid collapse of American 
territorial imperialism can to some extent be attributed to the fact 
that their views gained ground. 
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Another outlook of the time was what might be called hemispher- 
ism, which also had a long history in American politics. The term 
is used here to denote a form of expansionism which can best be 
described as continentalism plus the Caribbean Sea. I t  came to the 
fore under Seward and Grant. As late as 1895, Henry Cabot Lodge, 
soon to be one of the foremost advocates of imperialism, expressed 
the idea of hemispherism when he said "From Rio Grande to the 
Arctic Ocean there should be but one flag and one country." He did 
not consider expansion further to the south desirable - neither the 
people nor the land would be "desirable additions to the United 
States." At the same time he was anxious to have one of the islands 
in the Caribbean as a naval base and thought it would be necessary 
for the United States to acquire Cuba after the Isthmian Canal was 
built. Lodge also wanted to see Xawaii under American control, 
partly to protect the projected canal, also "for the sake of our 
commercial supremacy in the Pacific." 
Andrew Carnegie, the financial backer of the anti-imperialist 
movement, was in favor of acquiring not only Canada, but also 
Puerto Rico and Cuba, if the inhabitants of the islands agreed. Nor 
was the thought of such a development foreign to other leading 
anti-imperialists, such as George I?. Hoar and Carl Schurz. I t  should 
be pointed out that hemispherists also accepted the annexation of 
Hawaii. The arguments they used were partly the same as those 
brought out in connection with the Caribbean islands. As far as 
Cuba was concerned, the situation was complicated by the fact that 
Congress had pledged itself, through the Teller Resolution, to 
respect the independence of the island. But many Americans, and 
primarily the genuine imperialists of course, considered that this 
promise to Cuba had been hasty in the extreme. Thus Albert J. 
Beveridge proclaimed that "Cuba is a mere extension of our 
Atlantic coast-line, commanding the ocean entrances to the 
Mississippi and the Isthmian Canal." Even a man such as Richard 
Olney, Secretary of State in Cleveland's second administration, was 
a hemispherist. He considered American expansion in the Carib- 
bean Sea, with annexation of Cuba, a proper and desirable policy, 
while he sharply criticized expansion in the Pacific, in particular 
acquisition of the Philippines. Like many others he can be described 
as an informalist on hemispherist territory. 
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A third position at the turn of the century was globalism, properly 
a genuine, conscious imperialism, unrestrained by anything other 
than practical considerations in either geographical location and 
extent of the expansion area or the way in which the annexed regions 
were to be governed. The term does not in itself imply a desire for 
world supremacy or establishment of American colonies all over the 
world. The majority of men that could be described as globalists did 
not see the building of an empire as an end in itself and had no 
particular interest in a colonial empire of the British type. They 
were primarily interested in territorial expansion as a means of 
acquiring strategic bases which could safeguard America's position 
as a great power and supply the country with markets for raw 
materials, American products and investment. A more extreme 
form of expansionist dreams naturally existed, as when Josiah 
Strong predicted in 1885 that the American branch of the Anglo- 
Saxon race would "move down upon Mexico, down upon Central 
and South America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon 
Africa and beyond." But in general "the new imperialism" had 
a different outlook. 
In  an article called "Expansion not Imperialism,'' published in 
the pro-expansionist journal Outlook and probably written by its 
editor Lyman Abbot, the difference between a continentalist and 
an expansionist - what is here called a globalist - was said to be 
that whereas the latter "believes that American ideas and institu- 
tions are good for the whole world," the former thinks that they are 
only suitable for the North American continent. According to the 
Outlook, this did not mean that the latter was an imperialist and the 
former a democrat, but that the expansionist was a more radical, 
optimistic, enthusiastic democrat. 
Globalists usually denied that there was any fundamental differ- 
ence between the traditional American form of expansionism and 
the new form. During the presidential election campaign of 1900, 
Theodore Roosevelt often defended the new expansion when 
speaking in the West and South by arguing that the Republicans 
were only completing what the Democrats had started under 
Jefferson and Jackson, that the annexation of Louisiana was in 
principle no different from the acquisition of the Philippines. The 
young Beveridge, perhaps the most enthusiastic apostle of imperial- 
ism, made a celebrated speech in the autumn of 1898, which has 
gone down in history under the title, "The March of the Flag." 
He said, among other things: "And now, obeying the same voice 
that Jefferson heard and obeyed, that Seward heard and obeyed, 
William McKinley plants the flag over the islands of the seas, 
outposts of commerce, citadels of national security, and the march 
of the flag goes on!" He refuted the argument that American 
expansion should be restricted to contiguous territory as in former 
times: "Distance and oceans are no arguments.. . . Steam joins us; 
electricity joins us - the very elements are in league with our 
destiny. Cuba not contiguous! Hawaii and the Philippines not 
contiguous! Our navy will make them contiguous. Dewey and 
Sampson and Schley have made them contiguous, and American 
speed, American guns, American heart and brain and nerve will 
keep them contiguous forever. . . . " 
The globalists enthusiastically supported the policy of annexation 
after the Spanish-American War. Many widely varying types of 
motive were produced in favor of expansion, but the American 
consul-general in Shanghai, John Goodnow, went to the heart of 
the matter and spoke for many globalists when he declared before 
the peace treaty had been signed: "We should hold the Philippine 
islands, the Caroline islands and the Ladrone islands, also Cuba and 
Porto Rico. I t  does not matter whether we call them war indemnity 
or what. We need them in our business." 
For many globalists navalism was an important motive, and the in- 
fluence of Captain Alfred T .  Mahan should not be underestimated, 
particularly his influence on the little group of determined expan- 
sionists who were his faithful disciples and who through the posts 
they held could affect the course of decision-making and of foreign 
policy: John Hay, Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge among 
others. Another of the most active globalists was Whitelaw Reid, 
editor of the New York Tribune, friend of both John Hay and 
McKinley and appointed by the President to the Peace Commission 
in Paris. Reid also rejected the arguments of the continentalists: 
"Can a nation with safety set such limits to its development? When 
a tree stops growing, our foresters tell us, it is ripe for the ax." 
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The controversy over expansionism did not only concern and in a 
way did not primarily concern the geographical extent of expansion. 
What was more essential was the nature of annexations, the relation 
the new areas were to have with the United States. The problem of 
government organization gave rise to a passionate debate, and the 
fight between anti-imperialists and expansionists largely revolved 
around this aspect of the question. The old manifest destiny 
expansionism-that is continentalism-had not really produced 
this problem, since there it was a matter of contiguous territory, 
intended for settlement by Americans and gradual absorbtion into 
the Union. Integration and incorporation were self-evident goals. 
Constitutional arguments were one of the anti-imperialists' 
favorite weapons and played a prominent part in attempts to pre- 
vent ratification of the peace treaty with Spain. Senator West of 
Missouri introduced a resolution which declared that the Constitu- 
tion of the United States did not empower the federal Government 
to acquire areas to be retained and ruled as colonies: "all territory 
acquired by the government, except such small amount as may be 
necessary for coaling stations, must be acquired and governed with 
the purpose of ultimately organizing such territory into States 
suitable for admission into the Union." 
Nor did genuine globalists have problems over where they stood 
on this issue. Convinced expansionists, imperialists, naturally 
realized that expansion on any scale implied that new areas became 
colonies, that inhabitants in no way automatically became Ameri- 
can citizens, that the Constitution did not automatically extend to 
all territory where the American flag was flown. 
Even so, there were complications here too. The great majority 
of expansionists must have held a position somewhere in the middle, 
between the integrationists and the colonialists. Many of them 
disliked the word "colony" and emphasized humanitarian reasons 
for annexation, but could not at the same time conceive of accepting 
the consequences that incorporation would bring. They usually 
spoke vaguely of "the greatest possible degree of self-government" or 
"self-government as soon as the people concerned have shown that 
they are mature enough and as far as their capacity permits." Such 
phrases were also used by the colonialists. The difference was that 
for the convinced imperialists it was a question of practical solutions, 
where the important thing was to ensure a free hand. The motto of 
the anti-imperialists, and during the 1900 Presidential election 
campaign of the entire Democratic party, was that "The Constitu- 
tion follows the Flag." The debate was very confused, the lack of 
logic which marked many of the arguments was shown quite plainly 
when many newspapers and individuals that earlier had accepted 
the administration's expansion policy and praised the McKinley 
regime for the annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines also 
spoke up in favor of extension of the Constitution to all territory 
belonging to the United States. The problem came to a head when 
a bill was introduced in the spring of 1900 proposing a tariff 
between Puerto Rico and the United States. In the violent fight 
that followed, a large part of the Republican press went over to the 
oppostion. The tariff nonetheless was put through, and the question 
of the Constitution and the Flag was settled by the Supreme Court 
in the well-known Insular Cases of 1901 in which a divided Court 
established that annexed areas '"belonged to but were not a part of 
the United States." 
One of the individuals who fought for a colonial system was, not 
unexpectedly, Whitelaw Reid of the nibune.  He stated that "We 
have ample constitutional power to acquire and govern new terri- 
tory absolutely at  will, according to our sense of right and duty, 
whether as dependencies, as colonies, or as a protectorate." His 
arguments were to the point: if Americans could not hold the 
Philippines as a colony, then they could not hold the islands at all. 
I t  was, of course, unthinkable that they should open their doors to 
"Chinese or half-breed or what not" who would compete with 
American labor. They had to have the right to establish tariffs, 
otherwise the protectionist system would break down. Anyone 
contemplating letting these people into the Senate and the House of 
Representatives would be "the most imbecile of all the offspring of 
time." If there was any risk that the American people would be 
unable to restrain themselves from so acting, then it would be better 
to ask some civilized nation "with more common sense and less 
sentimentality and gush" to take over the newly acquired territories. 
Reid made this speech shortly after the treaty with Spain had 
received the consent of the Senate, following a long and intense 
debate. Like the other imperialists such as Roosevelt, Beveridge and 
Lodge, Reid rejected the constitutional arguments put forward by 
the anti-imperialists, and described them as "a crazy extension of 
the doctrine." "The rule of liberty, that all just government derives 
its authority from the consent of the governed, applies only to those 
who are capable of self-government," claimed Beveridge. 
Different people's interpretations of constitutional law usually 
concur with their attitudes toward expansionism. The theoretical 
side of the matter was ambiguous. Precedents pointed in different 
directions. So everyone could find points in support of an opinion. 
The attitude of the colonialists at its simplest was that territories 
could be acquired by the federal government for "any purpose 
which may seem desirable," and that Congress had the full right to 
legislate for these new areas, e.g., as far as taxes and tariffs were 
concerned, even if the territories had not been incorporated and 
were therefore not covered by the Constitution. 
Motives : National Interest, Duty, Destiny 
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American expansion displays an extremely rich flora of motives, 
more or less central, often combined or interwoven. By motive is 
meant here both perception and evaluation. One main group of 
motives can be distinguished, in which all the arguments deal with 
some aspect of National Interest. These motives are mainly of an 
economic-commercial nature, or concerned with international 
politics or strategy. The other main group comprises all the motives 
that do not fall into these categories. Their common factor is that 
they are usually either veiled in moral and idealistic terms, or are 
based on a perception of reality colored by deterministic ideas about 
human development. Duty and destiny are key-words in this sphere, 
and the arguments range from cultural and religious to racial 
considerations. 
Commercial expansion covered a motive generally recognized as 
attractive. The depression that had afflicted the United States 
during the 1890's had left deep scars. Both in the farming districts 
and in industry, general opinion was that the crisis had been the 
result of overcapacity and over-production and that the only hope 
lay in new markets for American products and capital-in expan- 
sion. This conviction was as rooted in the agrarian South and West 
as in the industrial Northeast and became a theme in almost all that 
Tvas said and written on the subject of expansion. This interest in 
foreign markets was nothing new. I t  had existed before the Civil 
War and steadily increased after 1865. The Commercial and Financial 
Journal expressed it succinctly in 1885: the time was at hand when 
America's large surplus production "must be employed in extend- 
ing American interests in other countries -or not at  all." But it was 
the panic of 1893 and the consequent financial crisis that gave 
currency to these ideas. 
"The output of factories working at full capacity is much greater 
than the domestic market can possibly consume, and it seems to be 
conceded that every year we shall be confronted with an increasing 
surplus of manufactured goods for sale in foreign markets if Ameri- 
can operatives and artisans are to be kept employed the year 
round," wrote Frederic Emory in the spring of 1898 in an analysis 
of America's foreign trade. The problem was equally serious for 
farmers and in his March of the Flag speech Beveridge pounded it 
out: "Today we are raising more than we can consume. Today, we 
are making more than we can use. Today our industrial society is 
congested; there are more workers than there is work; there is more 
capital than there is investment." And the self-evident solution to 
all these problems was said to be the acquisition of new markets and 
for many this meant territorial expansion, at least to the extent that 
was necessary for maintaining control over the new markets. 
Despite the lyrical descriptions by men such as Beveridge of the 
natural resources of the Philippines, the commercial interest in the 
islands was based on quite a different aspect, their presumed useful- 
ness as a gateway into the enormous Chinese market. Dewey's 
victory at Manila was significant in the context of activities of the 
European powers in China, more and more disturbing for American 
interests. In  an article with the eloquent title "Expansion Unavoid- 
able" published in Harper's Weekly in 1900, R. Van Bergen argued 
that territorial expansion was essential if America was to compete in  
the Chinese market. Without a nearby base, they would be helpless. 
Charles Denby, United States minister to China until 1898, had 
worked hard to further American commercial and manufacturing 
interests there. After his return home, he stressed the importance of 
the Chinese market and helped build an opinion for commitment 
in the Far East. He combined crass economic points of view with 
idealistic arguments, in a way that was characteristic of the expan- 
sionist debate. Sometimes the combination of missionary zeal and 
profit interest produced bizarre effects: "Fancy what would happen 
to the cotton trade if every Chinese wore a shirt: well, the missio- 
naries are teaching them to wear shirts." Denby described the rnis- 
sionary as "the forerunner of commerce." The hopes roused by the 
thought of the opportunities offered by the Chinese market were 
wildly exaggerated. Hay's Open Door policy was greeted with 
enthusiasm. His actions were in no way as significant as they were 
made out to be, but served to heighten feeling that China-and 
the Asian market as a whole-was a necessary and worthwhile 
venture. Quite unrealistic expectatiom about the possibility of 
exporting cotton textiles to China, produced a strong wave of 
expansionism in the Southern states. And this was where the 
Philippines became important: "With the Philippines as a three- 
quarter way house, forming a superb trading station, the bulk of 
this trade should come to this country." 
All sorts of apostles appeared. The influential economic writer 
Charles A. Conant considered commercial expansion necessary for 
the survival of the USA. What he thought important was not so 
much markets for surplus production or markets for raw materials, 
as markets for investment of America's excess of capital. According 
to Conant, America was in the same situation as the other highly- 
developed, industrial countries; hence the rivalry between them; 
inexorable and unavoidable conflicts would follow, as a result of 
tensions and antagonisms of world politics. In 1900 Conant pub- 
lished a collection of essays on this theme, under the title of "the 
Unites States in the Orient." 
A speech made by Chauncey Depew at the Republican Party 
Convention in 1900 provided a typical example of arguments used 
by commercial-economic expansionists. Depew posed the question 
of why there was war in South Africa, why the walls of Peking were 
being stormed, why troops were on the march in Asia and Africa, 
and why armies from foreign countries and empires were to be found 
there ? He supplied the answer : because production in civilized 
countries was greater than the countries could consume and because 
this overproduction led to stagnation and poverty. "The American 
people now produce $ 2,000,000,000 worth more than they can 
consume, and we have met the emergency, and by the statesman- 
ship of William McKinley, and by the valor of Roosevelt and his 
associates, we have our market in Cuba, we have our market in 
Puerto Rico, we have our market in the Philippines, we have our 
market in Hawaii, and we stand in the presence of 800,000,000 of 
people, with the Pacific as an American lake and the American 
artisans producing better and cheaper goods than any country in 
the world." A financier, Depew primarily had industrial over- 
production in mind, but in these years there was an equally im- 
portant agrarian expansionism. However, the group of agrarians 
that dominated the Democratic party, the farm businessmen, 
wanted a free global marketplace for American products, and 
they did not consider that this required annexation of areas to be 
governed as colonies. 
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Economic-commercial motives were often combined with argu- 
ments concerning the politics of power. Rivalry between the great 
powers was often looked upon as nothing more or less than pure 
economic competition. Conant announced in an article in Forum 
in July 1900 that the goal of the nation's leaders must to an ever- 
greater extent be to gain and retain markets and areas for invest- 
ment. The necessity of military and naval strength became obvious 
when it was a question of "seeking and holding exclusive markets 
on the one hand, and of increasing national competing power in 
free markets on the other." This was vital. The Journal of Commerce 
and Commercial Bulletin made almost the same claim, referring to 
China. "No political qualms about the dangers of territorial ex- 
pansion" could save the country from possibly having to defend 
with violence its rights and its opportunities on, say, the Chinese 
market. And in his analysis of America's foreign trade in the spring 
of 1898, Frederic Emory stated that isolationism must be left to the 
past. The United States had to accept the consequence of having 
become "a competitor in the world-wide struggle for trade." 
Starting from such premises, the step to a policy of expansion with 
annexation of new territory to achieve control of markets, was 
naturally not long. Captain Alfred T .  Mahan, advocate of navalism 
and mentor of Roosevelt and Lodge, summed up his view of the 
question in a couple of sentences in January 1900: "Sea power, as a 
national interest, commercial and military, rests not upon fleets 
only, but also upon local territorial bases in distant commercial 
regions. I t  rests upon them most securely when they are extensive, 
and when they have a numerous population bound to the sovereign 
country by those ties of interest which rest upon the beneficience of 
the ruler; of which beneficience power to protect is not the least 
factor." 
Another source from which the intellectual side of expansionism 
drew support was the theories of the historian Frederick Jackson 
Turner and the economist Brooks Adams. When developing his 
frontier thesis Turner emphasized that America was standing on the 
threshold of a new area, now that the last frontier had disappeared 
and there was no more free land. This did not mean, he pointed out, 
that "these energies of expansion" had disappeared, only that they 
had to seek new outlets: "The demands for a vigorous foreign 
policy, for an interoceanic canal, for a revival of our power upon 
the seas, and for the extension of American influence to outlying 
islands and adjoining countries, are indications that the movement 
will continue." The eccentric Brooks Adams also influenced the 
expansionists, not least his friends Roosevelt and Lodge. In  his 
book, The Law of Civiliiation and Decay, which attracted a great deal 
of attention, he developed the theory that only by absolute economic 
supremacy could America save itself from disintegration and decay. 
In  Adams' vision this meant American control of Asia. 
In  all this the navy loomed large. Mahan, Lodge, Roosevelt, 
Brooks Adams, and their sympathizers such as Senators William E. 
Chandler of New Hampshire and William P. Frye of Maine, saw 
the development of commercial and military-above all naval- 
power as facets of the same plan of action. Mahan had for years 
preached the necessity of a strong navy to protect interests in the 
Caribbean and Pacific, not least for support and protection of 
trading interests, and this implied territorial expansion, mainly in 
the form of naval bases and coaling stations, occasionally on a 
greater scale, all to ensure positions and markets. A canal joining the 
Atlantic with the Pacific had long been considered vital for com- 
mercial expansion. Annexation of Hawaii, Samoa, Puerto Rico, 
Cuba, was sometimes described as being necessary for protection of 
the canal. For expansionists of this type it was self-evident that the 
United States must leave the old isolationist policy and claim a 
rightful place among the other actors on the stage of world politics. 
Power and prestige were the key words. America was a great power 
and must act as one. I t  had to be clear that the USA was "a nation 
that knows its rights and dare maintain them-a nation that has 
come to stay, with an empire of its own in the China Sea," wrote 
Reid in 1900. There was no way back, for "our Continental Re- 
public has stretched its wings over the West Indies and the East. I t  
is a fact and not a theory." 
America's new position brought new responsibilities, which could 
not be shirked. Olney, admittedly critical of some aspects of 
McKinley's policy, claimed that the American people were gradual- 
ly realizing that earlier foreign policy had been "suitable to our 
infancy," but was unworthy of a nation which had reached matu- 
rity and strength and which had become "one of the foremost 
Powers of the earth and should play a commensurate part in its 
affairs." The same note was struck in many quarters. Charles Emory 
Smith, Postmaster General and onetime minister to Russia, said in 
a speech of October 1898 that "We have a new position in the great 
family of nations. We have stepped out upon the great stage of the 
world's action, and have become one of the great powers. We have 
advanced from continental domain to world-wide influence. We 
have risen to a new conception of our natural possibilities and our 
national greatness." Clinging to the old policy would be acting like 
a man who "would reject the railway and travel by the stage- 
coach," as Henry Watterson, editor of the Louisville Courier- Journal, 
put in in an interview. 
This feeling for America's new strength, of her having come of 
age as a great power, was often combined with an awareness of the 
deep and revolutionary changes taking place in the international 
power game. As early as 1895, Lodge had preached that the pass- 
word of the age was consolidation, not only with regard to capital 
and labor but on an international level. The day of the small nation 
was gone, the great powers were extending their rule over an in- 
creasingly great proportion of the people and countries of the world. 
Ever greater sections of the earth were being shared out in order to 
insure the future development of the great powers. One of the 
biggest changes was the shifting of the focal point from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific and the increasing importance of Asian markets. 
Watterson predicted in a homely but pointed figure of speech that 
the time would come when "the Pacific, and not the Atlantic, may 
become the washbasin of the universe." 
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Motives lying behind expansionism related to commercial oppor- 
tunities, power and prestige, can all be placed in one category under 
the rubric of national interest. Of those that fall outside this category 
the most important might be described as idealistic. Robert E.Osgood 
has distinguished motives and ends in a similar way, under the head- 
ingsof national self-interest and national ideals, in a penetrating analy- 
sis of the entire history of American foreign policy. But two important 
points must be made here. Firstly, it is not possible to draw a clear 
distinction between the two types. There are motives which, though 
formulated in idealistic terms, come within the sphere of self-interest. 
Secondly, and more important, the complex of motives that lies 
outside the national interest sphere comprises not only idealistic 
arguments but also the type of motive which refers to a development 
following laws that cannot be influenced or hindered. Such argu- 
ments usually refer to "the logic of events," "events, evolutionary or 
providential," "the march of events," "destiny" and such like. 
The New York Sun had said in the early 1890's when president 
Cleveland halted the annexation of Hawaii : "The policy of annexa- 
tion is the policy of destiny; and destiny always arrives." Shortly 
after the battle of Manila, McKinley said to his secretary: "We 
need Hawaii just as much and a great deal more than we did Cali- 
fornia. I t  is manifest destiny." This "new manifest destiny" was 
invoked by many expansionists, such as Congressman Gibson when 
in June 1898 he spoke in favor of annexation of Hawaii, just before 
the resolution was put to the vote. "Manifest destiny says, 'Take 
them in,' The American people say 'Take them,"' he remarked. 
The doctrine of inevitability came to be one of the cornerstones of 
expansion. Particularly when defending annexation of the Philip- 
pines it took the form of what Albert Weinberg has called moral 
determinism: "the will of God," "responsibilities forced upon us by 
destiny," "Providence," "duty determined by destiny," "the finger 
of God." 
This group of ideas was characterized by a shifting between 
destiny, right and duty: the stronger nation has a moral duty to 
intervene to help the weaker. The stronger has a right to intervene, 
because his higher development has given him insight into what is best 
and what is needed to solve a problem. With the addition of con- 
temporary racial ideas and Social-Darwinist arguments, the next 
contention was that not only duty and right existed but laws 
dictated by God or Nature which ordained the future. The key 
words were not power and prestige, but dug and destiny, with 
emphasis on duty, while the ideas of destiny colored the perception 
of reality. The categories into which motives fell can be used to 
differentiate between cultural imperialism, religious imperialism, 
and racial imperialism, often interlaced. 
There was one motive which recurred more frequently than any 
other, and which appeared in practically all the expansionist talk, 
whatever the source. This was the humanitarian tasks said to be 
facing Americans in the new territories, the moral demands that lay 
behind the intervention against Spain and which continued to guide 
the policies of the United States. These purely idealistic, moral 
arguments dominated the debate, often alone, but on many occa- 
sions combined with one or more other motives. ThomasJ. Hudson 
was convinced that America had gone to war for "purely humani- 
tarian principles," "in a spirit of purest altruism -without reward 
or hope of reward." The enthusiastically expansionist Governor 
Wolcott in Colorado put it to the Republican Party Convention in 
1900: "The spirit of justice and liberty prompts us in our determi- 
nation to give the dusky races of the Philippines the blessings of good 
government and republican institutions." Subsequent variations 
were innumerable, but there was always the declaration that the 
policy of the United States on the territories surrendered by Spain 
was dictated by high moral motives, a duty to humanity that they 
had no right to evade. The anti-imperialists denied that this in itself 
praiseworthy feeling of moral responsibility necessitated converting 
the new territories into colonies, but many of those who claimed to 
be opposeed to annexation also explained that they faced an 
imperative duty. The moral motive for expansion sounded in 
McKinley's letter of acceptance in 1908: "Every effort has been 
directed to their peace and prosperity, their advancement and 
well-being, not for our aggrandizement nor for the pride of might, 
nor for trade and commerce, nor for exploitation, but for humanity 
and civilization, and for the protection of the vast majority of the 
population who welcome our sovereignty against the designing 
minority." The American Grocer showed the same touching concern 
when it wrote that the mission of the United States might be to 
break the moral and physical fetters which bound the eight or ten 
million natives of the Phillippines, and possiby this could not be 
accomplished without retention of the islands. 
Even if many people felt these moral considerations to be genuine 
and convincing, it is obvious that they were based on or closely 
allied to ideas about different kinds of superiority, variations on the 
theme of the white man's burden. Sometimes ideas of cultural, 
religious, and racial imperialism were clearly expressed. American 
men of religion, mainly from the Protestant churches, morally 
justified territorial expansion. They did not restrict themselves to 
idealistic alibis for annexations, but were a force within the expan- 
sionist movement, standing with navalists and businessmen. Orga- 
nized Christianity had also helped rouse the warlike mood that 
preceded the war with Spain. What is striking here is that the 
missionary zeal of which they spoke so much often ignored or con- 
cealed that the natives had been Christian for many a long year. 
They were Catholics, however, and it was no coincidence that 
Catholic churchmen in the United States were less responsive to 
expansionist enthusiasm than their Protestant colleagues. 
A book by Robert E. Speer, Missions and Modern Histoy, provides 
many examples of arguments put forward by Protestant leaders. 
Speer was secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presby- 
terian Church. While the Social Darwinists considered all evolution 
the result of unshakable laws, Speer preached the will of God. I t  was 
God's intention that Christian nations should subjugate the world, 
in order to liberate the peoples of the world. Christian states had the 
right to intervene in non-Christian countries, for religious and 
humanitarian reasons. In  general Speer equated Christian countries 
and civilized countries and consequently his arguments and opinions 
were close to those of the cultural imperialists. He claimed it the 
duty of civilized nations to maintain law and order, including pro- 
tection of investments. He hastened to add, however, that only 
moral reasons could justify the exercise of power by the Western 
world. 
All sorts of clerics echoed these arguments. The Reverend Dr. 
MacArthur of Calvary Baptist Church celebrated Dewey's victory 
at Manila with a sermon full of religious-humanitarian enthusiasm 
and quoted in the New York Tribune : "The Philippine Islands. . . 
should be made the garden of the universe.. . . We will fill them 
with school houses and missionaries." In  an article in The National 
Magazine, Thomas J. Hudson stated as a maxim of Christian ethics, 
the duty of every Christian nation to do what it could for the pro- 
motion of Christian civilization throughout the world. Nor did he 
have doubts regarding the means. Christ himself had seen that 
Christian civilization "could not be successfully engrafted upon 
human society by means less drastic than the sword." Less aggress- 
ive was the theory that the Americans were God's chosen people: 
"We imagine that God has called us to the rulership of the world. 
He sends us, as He sent His well-beloved son, to serve the world and 
thus to rule the world," said the President of Ohio Wesleyan 
University in a speech in September 1899. 
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As pointed out, the dividing line between these "religious expan- 
sionists" and those individuals who argued in terms of culture and 
civilization was fluid. A magnificent specimen of this combination 
of religious and humanitarian idealism, of nationalism and a 
feeling of power, is to be found in a speech made by Senator John 
M. Thurston of Nebraska on May 25 1899: "God reigns; and in the 
sunshine of His guidance we go marching on- on under a flag, that 
symbolizes the highest aspirations of the human race. Washington 
made it the flag of independence; Lincoln made it the flag of 
liberty; McKinley has made it the flag of man's humanity for man 
-until today, on land and sea, the wide world round, serenely 
uplifted towards empyrean blue- kissed by the sun of day, wooed 
by the stars of night, feared by tyrants, beloved by mankind-it 
tranquilly floats, the unconquered flag of the greatest nation of the 
earth.'' 
Cultural and racial imperialism often went together. The transfer 
from one to the other was frequently undetectable, since the concept 
of race was usually vague and indistinguishable from civilization, 
culture, nation. Sometimes it was a question of a feeling that the 
Anglo-Saxon culture was superior, morally, sometimes a racial 
philosophy comprising a masterrace mentality. That the Anglo- 
Saxons were a superior race was an opinion generally held; some- 
times the Teutonic race was included. This racialist thinking was 
most evident in relation to colored people where the idea of race 
combined easily with ideas on culture and civilization. Both 
imperialists and anti-imperialists agreed, and indeed one of the 
most common anti-imperialist arguments was that there was a great 
risk in annexation of lower, barbaric races. When the imperialist 
Chauncey Depew declared that there was no question of incorpo- 
rating "the alien races, and civilized, semi-civilized, barbarous and 
savage peoples of these islands [the Philippines] into our body 
politic," he was following the same line as his bitterly anti-imperial- 
ist colleague, Senator George F. Hoar from Massachusets, although 
they drew totally different conclusions from this starting point. 
Congressman Champ Clark in a speech opposing the annexation of 
Hawaii in June 1898 used the existence of Chinese people in the 
islands as an argument against annexation: "How can we endure 
our shame when a Chinese Senator from Hawaii with his pigtail 
hanging down his back, with his pagan joss in his hand, shall rise 
from his curule chair and in pigeon English proceed to chop logic 
with George Frisbie Hoar or Henry Cabot Lodge? 0 tempora! 
0 mores !" 
Moral reasons recur. The arguments are similar to those used by 
cultural imperialists. I n  an article in Forum, Conant declared that 
the cause of modern social progress had been committed to the 
Anglo-Saxons by the historical evolution of events. If this task were 
relused, the world would sink back into darkness and barlsarism: 
< <  I t  is a mission of the highest altruism, in which commercial and 
economic forces play a part only because econoniic efficiency is the 
fruit of freedom, and the people of the highest moral ideas are those 
capable of doing the most in the world." The same thought was 
expressed more brutally in the Detroit Tribune, thai it was best for 
mankind when countries and territories were in the hands of those 
who could best rule: "and as a rule, those can best govern who are 
capable of conquering. That is the reason that conquest is moral 
enough for all practical purposes." 
Professor Theodore Marburg of Harvard defended the expansion 
and conquests of the Anglo-Saxon race on the ground that the race 
was superior in qualities that contributed to human advance. He 
sought a moral justification: "Man's express duty is the uplifting of 
man. . . . The duty to uplift and elevate himself and his fellows thus 
becomes an end in itself and a justification of . . . life." But it is 
interesting to see the next stage of his argument: the nation that 
blocks the way of progress must expect to be pushed aside "by more 
powerful and vigorous blood." With these words he came close to 
the racial ideas which often appeared in connection with American 
expansionism. As early as 1885, Strong had in his well-known book 
applied the ideas of social darwinism to the coming American 
expansion. "The time is coming when the pressure of population on 
the means of subsistence will be felt here as it is now felt in Europe 
and Asia." There would be a decisive battle between the races, for 
which the Anglo-Saxon had been trained: "the mighty centrifugal 
tendency, inherent in this stock and strengthened in the United 
States, will assert itself. Then this race of unequaled energy . . . 
having developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress 
its institutions upon mankind, will spread itself over the earth." 
In  the same year John Fiske discussed similar ideas in an essay with 
the eloquent title, Manifest Destinz. A few years later these ideas re- 
ceived political application, and at the same time the blessing of 
science by John MT. Burgess, professor at Columbia and a pioneer 
in the field of political science. Burgess, whose work had a consider- 
able influence, claimed that the laws of evolution would inexorably 
result in a world ruled by the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic races, 
since they enjoyed superior abilities in building and governing states. 
This superiority also meant that they had a duty to lead and rule the 
world. 
Theodore Roosevelt had studied under Burgess at Columbia, and 
his ideas on the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race showed a close 
resemblance to those of his teacher. Both men used the term race 
rather vaguely, equating it with nation or culture. Compared to 
that of many of his contemporaries Roosevelt's racism was reason- 
ably moderate. He often expressed the opinion, that inferior peoples 
were not permanently or inherently inferior, but had the chance of 
reaching a higher level of development. Together with Henry Gabot 
Lodge and other imperialists he nonetheless believed in the su- 
periority of the Anglo-Saxon race and its inevitable victory over 
inferior or degenerate races. The war against Spain was often put in 
this context. The great past of the Spanish people was acknowledg- 
ed, bxt they were seen as a nation that had ceased to make progress. 
The Spaniards were a people on the decline, while the new age 
belonged to the young, virile, dynamic American nation- and the 
Anglo-Saxon race. 
These ideas were expounded with clarity by Thomas J. Hudson 
in his essay on "Evolution and the Spanish-American War." The 
war was in the natural order of the developmelit of civilization. 
Natural law governed: "War is just as essential a factor in the 
evolution of civilization as it is in organic evolution," and for the 
same reasons : every step taken forwards and upwards has been made 
possible by "the slaughter of the unfit, thus making room for the 
existence and development of the higher orders." Every step forward 
in civilization had been the result of war. Another scholar, H. H. 
Powers, an erstwhile professor of economics at Stanford University, 
saw the evolution of the world as a Darwinian struggle for power 
between races and nations. He considered the defeat and routing of 
inferior, less efficient forms by more efficient, superior ones to be a 
law of nature, as immovable as the law of gravity: there was as little 
reason to moralize over the one as over the other. I t  was a matter of 
adapting as wisely as possible to conditions nobody could change. 
In  his usual way Beveridge went to the point as far as this motive 
was concerned. On  January 9, 1900, lie made a speech on the 
Philippines in the Senate which attracted a good deal of attention 
and took the form of a catalog of imperialism, an inventory of 
conceivable motives for expansion. His address was delivered with 
such brilliance that, as Mr. Dooley ironically remarked, you could 
almost waltz to it: "God has not been preparing the English- 
speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but 
vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. No! He has 
made us the master organizers of the world to establish systems 
where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to over- 
whelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us 
adepts in government that we may administer among savages and 
senile peoples. Were it not for such a force as this, the world would 
relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race he has 
I marked the American people as his chosen nation to finally lead in 
the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America, 
and it holds for us all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness 
possible to men." 
5 
I 
I Shortly after Manila Bay another expansion doctrine appeared: 
that, in general, when a nation intervenes to overthrow oppression 
it takesupon itself responsibility for the people it liberates. This theme 
recurred and was used by Roosevelt who described it as partly "an 
axiom of international law," partly "an axiom of morals." And the 
application of the theory followed the customary pattern. The 
I 
islands could not be returned to Spain. Nor could they be left to 
their own devices. That would result in chaos, barbarism, anarchy. 
The great powers of the Old World would also immediately start 
pressing their interests. 
I n  his celebrated interview with a delegation of Methodist 
clergymen in 1899, President McKinley explained how, after 
praying to God for enlightenment and guidance, he had suddenly 
realized how the Philippine problem must be solved and been . 
shown how annexation was the only way open to him: ". . . and it 
came to me this way . . . 1) That we could not give them back to 
Spain- that would be cowardly and dishonorable; 2) that we could 
not turn them over to France or Germany, our commercial rivals 
in the Orient-that would be bad business and discreditable; 
3) that we could not leave them to themselves- they were unfit for 
self-government- and they would soon have anarchy and misrule 
over there worse than Spain's was; and 4) that there was nothing 
left for us to do but take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and 
uplift and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best 
we could for them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died." 
As Ernest May has pointed out, McKinley's story of how he reached 
his decision is a concoction, a pleasing little tale, that did not fail 
to impress his audience. But at the same time the President gave an 
accurate summary of arguments used most often by the administra- 
tion to influence public opinion and ensure ratification of the treaty 
with Spain, and which also constituted the main defence against 
attacks by the anti-imperialists. Expansionists of all shades used the 
argument that, quite apart from the question of national interest, 
the USA had a moral duty to remain in the Philippines. The 
strength of this argument was illustrated by the fact that anti- 
imperialists had great difficulty getting around it. Even Bryan was 
forced to consider a temporary American control of the islands, 
until "a stable form of government" could be established, and then 
continued American protection against external interference. 
Catalysts 
The verbose arguments of the expansionists have been shown to 
contain groups of motives. A feature of most of them was that there 
is no logical connection between their perception of reality and the 
recommendation of an imperialistic foreign policy. Even the anti- 
imperialists were in favor of commercial expansion, could accept 
naval bases and coaling stations for the benefit of trade and shipping, 
were convinced of the superiority of American civilization and the 
Anglo-Saxon race. Since even the globalists often made such exten- 
sive use of moral terms and categories, one gets the impression that 
in many respects the two sides had common values, or at least 
professed to have. Still, these people with such similar beliefs had 
diametrically opposed, or at least varied, opinions on expansionism. 
This was partly because they often used the same words and phrases, 
even when their goals were widely separate. There are other expla- 
nations. 
Active, aware, enthusiastic expansionists often shared a dream of 
action, expressed in impatient, frustrated energy, in eager, newly 
awakened hopes for the future, in an intense desire to test their 
strength in a fight. Typical was the attitude of Roosevelt, put in 
words in a spccch at the Republican National Convention at 
Philadelphia in June 1900: "4s America a weakling, to shrink horn 
the world work that must be done by the world powers? No. The 
young giant of the West stands on a continent that clasps the crest 01 
an ocean in either hand. Our nation, glorious in youth and strength, 
looks into the future with fearless and eager eyes and rejoices as a 
strong man to run a race." There can be no doubt that he was 
expressing "the spirit of expansionism," the emotional foundation of 
expansion at this time. I t  was newly awakened, emotionally charged, 
borne up by dreams of future triumph and greatness, filled with 
assurance of the nation's ever-growing strength, a surplus energy 
seeking new tasks. Roosevelt appealed not to reason but to emotioa. 
The speech was received with a roof-raising ovation, and was 
described by a member of the audience as a masterly demonstration 
of "spiritual, grammatical and physical virility." 
This desire for action sprang partly from the young America's 
feeling of strength. The Chicago Times-Herald declared in July 1898 : 
"We also want Puerto Rico . . . . The spirit of national development 
has seized the people. We want Hawaii now. Fortunately we will 
not have to fight for it; we will annex it next week. We may want the 
Carolines, the Ladrones, the Pelew, and the Mariana groups. If we 
do, we will take them." At t lx  same time the Denver hTews stated 
that '"The American people are overwhelmingly in favor of holding 
every foot of ground over which the flag is raised. The instinct is 
rooted in them, and it is a sound and good instinct." 
But another important factor that lay behind this impatient 
longing for action was the increasing population pressure in the 
United States. As Richard Hofstadter has pointed out, aggressive 
expansionism was giving vent to a feeling of frustration. The last 
frontier had closed, economic depression and immigration had 
given rise to a feeling of diminished opportunities, while the cliang- 
ing structure of society created unrest and uncertainty which could 
all too easily be transformed into aggression. Franklin 13. Giddings, 
a professor at Columbia wrote in 1899 in the Political Science Quarterly 
that the American people constituted "the most stupendous reser- 
voir of seething energy to be found on any continent.. . . If, by any 
mistaken policy, it is denied an outlet, it may discharge itself in 
anarchistic, socialistic, and other destructive modes that are likely 
to work incalculable mischief." Impatience was growing as a conse- 
quence of changes in American society, where "opportunity for 
adventure and daring enterprise" was rapidly disappearing. 
Americans were "liable to an outbreak of Warlike spirit." 
Warlike mentality was partly the product of the development of 
society, and of the current situation in the country. A similar idea 
was put forward in the Banker's Magazine during the autumn of 
1898, suggesting that the new American foreign policy was beyond 
control. I t  was an instinctive reaction in the growing population, 
hitherto used to elbow room, but which was finding that the country 
was getting crowded. According to Giddings the situation in Cuba 
had given the American people "the first apparently decent excuse 
for fighting" since the Civil War. The country's move toward 
expansionism was perfectly natural; "at this stage in the develop- 
ment of the United States, territorial expansion is as certain as the 
advent of spring after winter." 
